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INTRODUCTION 
The Occupy Wall Street movement has generated passionate reac-
tions of either disdain or support since its inception.  On the one 
hand, opponents deride the movement for lacking a clear objective 
and vilifying the economic engines of the nation.1  On the other hand, 
proponents praise the movement for bringing a much-needed voice to 
 
*
 Advocacy Director of the New York Civil Liberties Union and adjunct professor at 
New York Law School. 
 1. James Oliphant, Herman Cain Steps Up Occupy Wall Street Criticism, San 
Francisco Chronicle (Oct. 10, 2011), http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/ 
a/2011/10/09/MNLD1LFG8D.DTL (reporting on Republican presidential candidate 
Herman Cain’s belief that the Occupy demonstrators oppose capitalism and are jeal-
ous of the successes of affluent Americans, and House Majority Leader Eric Cantor’s 
(R-VA) view of the demonstrators as “mobs” who are pitting “Americans against 
Americans”); Andrew Rafferty, Santorum Supporters Tell Occupy Protesters at Ral-
ly: ‘Get a Job’, MSNBC (Feb. 14, 2012, 1:21 AM), http://firstread.msnbc.msn.com/_ 
news/2012/02/14/10402152-santorum-supporters-tell-occupy-protesters-at-rally-
get-a-job (reporting on a Rick Santorum rally in Washington where his supporters 
yelled at Occupy demonstrators to “get a job”); Douglas Schoen, Polling the Occupy 
Wall Street Crowd, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 18, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000 
1424052970204479504576637082965745362.html (criticizing the Occupy movement 
for being on the radical left and out of touch with most Americans). Contra Bill 
O’Reilly Attacks Ben and Jerry Owners for Occupy Wall Street Involvement, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 29, 2012, 10:10 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/ 
02/29/bill-oreilly-ben-and-jerry-occupy-wall-stret_n_1309907.html (describing Bill 
O’Reilly’s criticism of the Occupy movement). 
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the victims of a decades-long march towards policies that benefit the 
rich over everyone else.2 
What neither side can deny, however, is that the Occupy Wall 
Street movement has already achieved what many social movements 
never accomplish: it has elevated the concerns identified by the 
movement to the forefront of the national discourse.  Regardless of 
whether one agrees that there exists a problem of economic inequali-
ty, we are talking about it. 
Similarly, though less glamorously, this movement has challenged 
the law and the legal profession.  The spontaneity and decentralized 
structure of the movement has made it difficult for lawyers to ade-
quately represent the interests of the movement.  Moreover, new le-
gal questions have arisen about the use of privately owned public 
spaces for the purposes of political protests.3  Finally, age-old prob-
lems associated with police reactions to political protests have also 
continued to challenge the legal profession’s ability to respond quick-
ly and adequately to the needs of the movement.  This includes prob-
lems associated with police crowd control tactics, use of excessive 
force, false arrests, searches, denial of access to the media, and sur-
veillance of political activity.4 
 
 2. See, e.g., Max Berger, Opposing View: Occupy is Making a Difference, USA 
TODAY (Feb. 9, 2012, 8:02 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/story/2012-
02-09/Occuppy-Wall-Street-Berger/53032498/1 (praising the Occupy demonstrators 
for focusing the nation’s attention on the undue influence that the wealthy have on 
the nation’s policies); Charles Biderman, Making the Case for Occupy Wall Street, 
FORBES (Feb. 9, 2012, 4:38 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/investor/2012/02/09/ma 
king-the-case-for-occupy-wall-street (agreeing with the Occupy demonstrators’ ob-
servations that while Wall Street has bounced back from the recession, most Ameri-
cans are still suffering economically); Jane Lindholm, Ben & Jerry’s Endorses Occu-
py Wall Street, VERMONT PUBLIC RADIO (Feb. 10, 2012), available at http://www. 
vpr.net/news_detail/93360/ben-jerrys-endorses-occupy-wal-street (reporting on Ben 
and Jerry’s endorsement and support of the Occupy Wall Street movement); Kim Pe-
terson, Bruce Springsteen Takes on Wall Street: The Musician’s 17th Studio Album 
Explores Many of the Same Themes as the Occupy Wall Street Movement, MSN 
MONEY (Feb. 21, 2012, 2:14 PM), http://money.msn.com/top-
stocks/post.aspx?post=7b0d 
88b3-0ae5-4ace-913b-7cc35afeccb2 (reporting on Bruce Springsteen’s belief that the 
Occupy demonstrators have changed the national conversation to reflect the move-
ment’s concerns). 
 3. This Article does not address the question of when should private spaces be 
considered public forums for purposes of First Amendment scrutiny. 
 4. See Letter from Christopher Dunn, Arthur Eisenberg, Donna Lieberman & 
Udi Ofer, Directors, New York City Civil Liberties Union, to Raymond Kelly, Police 
Commissioner, New York City Police Department (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.nyclu. 
org/files/releases/NYCLU_Ltr_to_Kelly_re_OWS_10-20-11.pdf (requesting that the 
NYPD allow the use of tents and portable toilets in Zuccotti Park and expressing 
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This Article will focus on one of the key challenges that the move-
ment has faced: overnight camping in traditional public forums like 
parks.  One of the hallmarks of the Occupy Wall Street movement 
has been, as its name suggests, the symbolic occupation of institutions 
and interests, by taking over public (and sometimes private) space.5  
The movement began in Manhattan’s financial district when its early 
participants, after failing to find adequate space in the heart of Wall 
Street, settled a few blocks away in Zuccotti Park, a privately owned 
public park.6  They quickly made their presence permanent, erecting 
 
concern over the nearly blanket NYPD videotaping of Occupy Wall Street events, as 
well as unlawful arrests and use of excessive force against Occupy Wall Street de-
monstrators); see also Letter from Christopher Dunn, Arthur Eisenberg & Donna 
Lieberman, Directors, New York Civil Liberties Union, to Michael R. Bloomberg, 
Mayor, New York City, and Raymond Kelly, Police Commissioner, New York City 
Police Department (Nov. 21, 2011), http://www.nyclu.org/files/releases/NYCLU% 
20Ltr%20to%20Mayor%20Bloomberg%20re%20Press-OWS%2011-21-11.pdf (ob-
jecting to the mistreatment of journalists seeking to cover the policing of the Occupy 
Wall Street protests). 
 5. See, e.g., Associated Press, Portland’s Occupy Protesters Face Permit Dead-
line, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Nov. 29, 2011), http://www.pressherald.com/news/ 
Portlands-Occupy-protesters-face-permit-deadline-.html (describing the desires of 
Occupy Portland demonstrators to maintain a presence at a park outside of the State 
House); Dome Warms Occupy Buffalo Protesters, N. COUNTRY PUB. RADIO (Dec. 6, 
2011), http://www.northcountrypublicradio.org/news/story/18895/20111206/dome-war 
ms-occupy-buffalo-protesters (reporting on Occupy demonstrators’ plans to stay at a 
park throughout the winter); Jeremy C. Fox, Where Did Dewey Square Get Its 
Name? A Short History of the Occupy Boston Site, BOSTON GLOBE (Nov. 1, 2011), 
http://articles.boston.com/2011-11-01/yourtown/30346696_1_transportation-hub-
railroads-william-m-fowler (chronicling the history of Dewey Square, where Occupy 
Boston has set up a tent city); Ian Lovett, Occupy Los Angeles Camp Is Allowed to 
Stay, for Now, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/23/us/ 
occupy-camp-at-los-angeles-city-hall-allowed-to-stay-for-now.html (describing the 
Occupy Los Angeles tent city encampment surrounding City Hall in Los Angeles); 
“Occupy” Supporters Camp in Centennial Park, ABC-7 WZVN (Oct. 17, 2011), 
http://www.abc-7.com/story/15714726/occupy-protesters-camp-out-in-support (re-
porting on Occupy Fort Myers’ plans to camp out indefinitely in a park); Bedel Saget 
& Archie Tse, How Occupy Wall Street Turned Zuccotti Park into a Protest Camp, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/10/05/nyregion/ 
how-occupy-wall-street-turned-zuccotti-park-into-a-protest-camp.html (reporting on 
Occupy Wall Street’s transformation of Zuccotti Park into a living and operations 
center). 
 6. Laura Batchelor, Occupy Wall Street Lands on Private Property, CNN MON-
EY (Oct. 6, 2011, 2:32 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/10/06/news/companies/occupy 
_wall_street_park/index.htm (describing how Occupy Wall Street settled on Zuccotti 
Park and the advantages of staying at a privately owned public park); Colin Moyni-
han, Wall Street Protest Begins, with Demonstrators Blocked, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 
2011, 4:26 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/17/wall-street-protest-
begins-with-demonstrators-blocked/ (describing the first day of protests, with no 
mention of Zuccotti Park); Colin Moynihan, Wall Street Protests Continue, with at 
Least 6 Arrested, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2011, 12:28 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.ny 
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a little village with amenities such as a kitchen, medical station, media 
hub, and library.7  Zuccotti Park did not have an overnight curfew 
like city-owned parks in New York City.8  As demonstrators in New 
York City occupied Zuccotti Park, similar occupations of parks began 
to spread throughout the nation.9 
A tussle for permanence quickly gripped the Zuccotti Park protes-
tors and similar demonstrators as government officials in New York 
City, like other officials across the nation, disapproved of the demon-
strators’ overnight presence, and cited the prohibition on camping as 
the reason for the protesters to leave.10  In New York City, 
Brookfield Properties, which owns Zuccotti Park, also objected to the 
 
times.com/2011/09/19/wall-street-protests-continue-with-at-least-5-arrested/ (describ-
ing protesters sleeping overnight at Zuccotti Park). 
 7. See Saget & Tse, supra note 5; see also Jeff Gordinier, Want to Get Fat on 
Wall Street? Try Protesting, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/10/12/dining/protesters-at-occupy-wall-street-eat-well.html (reporting on the 
free meals provided to Occupy demonstrators at Zuccotti Park); James Thilman, In-
side Occupy Wall Street’s New 24-Hour Medical Center, GOTHAMIST (Nov. 8, 2011, 
4:41 PM), http://gothamist.com/2011/11/08/inside_occupy_wall_streets_new_24-h.php 
(reporting on the round-the-clock medical tent at Zuccotti Park staffed by emergency 
room physicians, general practitioners and registered nurses); Adam Warner, At 
Zuccotti Park, a People’s Library, CITY LIMITS (Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.citylimits. 
org/news/articles/4451/at-zuccotti-park-a-people-s-library (describing the 1,200 book 
library at Zuccotti Park). 
 8. New York City parks are generally open from 6 a.m. to 1 a.m.  See City of 
New York Parks & Recreation, Rules & Regulations, §1-03(a). Moreover, individu-
als may not camp in a public park in New York City without a permit. See City of 
New York Parks & Recreation, Rules & Regulations §1-04(p) (“Unlawful camping. 
No person shall engage in camping, or erect or maintain a tent, shelter, or camp in 
any park without a permit.”).  It is unclear whether camping in Zuccotti Park was 
prohibited by Brookfield Properties prior to the arrival of the Occupy demonstrators.  
At the time of their arrival, there were no posted rules in Zuccotti Park prohibiting 
camping, however Brookfield Properties has maintained that such a prohibition had 
been part of its unwritten rules for the park.   
 9. See supra note 4. 
 10. Esmé E. Deprez & Alison Vekshin, New York Police in Riot Gear Clear ‘Oc-
cupy’ Protesters From Zuccotti Park, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Nov. 15, 2011), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-15/u-s-mayors-crack-down-on-occupy-wall-
street.html (reporting on the NYPD’s removal from Zuccotti Park of protesters who 
had been camping in the park); Anemona Hartocollis, Facing Eviction, Protesters 
Begin Park Cleanup, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2011, http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2011/10/13/told-to-leave-protesters-talk-pre-emptive-strategy/ (reporting on the 
cleanup of Zuccotti Park conducted by Occupy demonstrators to try to prevent the 
removal of their tents and other structures from the park); Protesters in, Tents out at 
NYC ‘Occupy’ Park: Judge Upholds Mayor Bloomberg’s Zuccotti Park Camp Evic-
tion, MSNBC (Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/45299622/ns/us_news-
life/t/protesters-tents-out-nyc-occupy-park/ (describing the return of protesters to 
Zuccotti Park after being evicted by the NYPD, and the new enforced prohibition on 
bringing tents, tarps and other equipment into the park.). 
OFER_CHRISTENSEN 7/11/2012  9:27 AM 
2012] OCCUPY THE PARKS 1159 
protesters’ permanent presence, citing not only a prohibition on 
camping but also alleging that the park, which is meant for enjoyment 
by the public and community residents, was being shut down by the 
protesters to the detriment of the greater public, and that security and 
health risks had arisen.11  Brookfield Properties and New York City 
planned to clear the park of overnight demonstrators on October 14, 
2011 but abruptly decided not to, following pressure from the public 
and elected officials.12  On November 15, however, they succeeded.  
Although demonstrators were eventually permitted back inside the 
park at all times, they were prohibited from sleeping or camping in 
the park.13  Similarly, Occupy demonstrators have been pushed out of 
other parks across the nation.14 
As government officials began to object to the permanent camping 
in parks by demonstrators, the Occupy movement’s participants were 
left with four options: (1) leave the parks; (2) engage in civil disobedi-
ence and risk arrest by staying overnight in parks; (3) attempt to ne-
gotiate a settlement that would allow them to stay overnight in parks; 
and (4) file First Amendment challenges to the restrictions on engag-
 
 11. See Meghan Barr, Patience Tested over Waste, Crime at Protest Sites, 
CNSNEWS (Oct. 25, 2011), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/patience-tested-over-
waste-crime-protest-sites; Perry Chiaramonte, Owners of Zuccotti Park Say Condi-
tions Unsanitary from Wall Street Protests, FOX NEWS (Oct. 7, 2011), http://www. 
foxnews.com/us/2011/10/07/owners-zuccotti-park-says-conditions-unsanitary-from-
wall-street-protests; Fire Officials Conduct Safety Inspection of Zuccotti Park, Re-
move Generators and Gasoline Cans, CBS NEW YORK (Oct. 28, 2011), http://new 
york.cbslocal.com/2011/10/28/police-fire-officials-conducting-surprise-inspection-of-
zuccotti-park. 
 12. See Michael Barbaro & Kate Taylor, Calls Flood In, City Backs Off and Pro-
testers Stay, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/15/nyregion 
/occupy-wall-street-protesters-remain-in-zuccotti-park-as-cleanup-is-canceled.html; 
Joe Coscarelli & Alex Klein, City Backs Down in Zuccotti Standoff, Occupy Wall 
Street Protesters Emboldened, N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 14, 2011), http://nymag.com/daily/ 
intel/2011/10/zuccotti_park_cleaning_cancell.html; Colin Moynihan & Cara Buckley, 
Cleanup of Zuccotti Park is Postponed, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2011), http://cityroom. 
blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/14/cleanup-of-zuccotti-park-cancelled/; Dean Meminger, 
Protesters and Police Clash During “Occupy Wall Street” March, NY1 (Oct. 14, 
2011), http://www.ny1.com/content/top_stories/148951/protesters-and-police-clash-
during--occupy-wall-street--march (describing the march that took place after pro-
testers learned that they would be allowed to remain in Zuccotti Park). 
 13. Occupy Wall Street Returns to Zuccotti Park, CBS NEWS (Jan. 10, 2012), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_162-57356673/occupy-wall-street-returns-to-zuc 
cotti-park; Colin Moynihan, Occupy Wall Street Drops Suit on Zuccotti Park, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 24, 2012), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/24/occupy-wall-stre 
et-drops-suit-on-zuccotti-park. 
 14. Scott Neuman, As Occupy Camps Close, What’s Next for Movement?, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/11/15/142359267/as-occupy-
camps-close-whats-next-for-movement; see also infra note 14. 
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ing in expressive and symbolic protest activities.  Demonstrators have 
attempted all four options.  Many have been arrested while engaging 
in civil disobedience.15  Numerous encampments have been allowed 
to remain overnight following negotiations and settlement agree-
ments,16 and numerous lawsuits have been filed.17 
The option of litigation has proven largely unproductive, as many 
years of bad precedent have greatly limited the ability of members of 
the public to make constitutional arguments for the right to engage in 
overnight protest activities in public parks.18  Indeed, many lawyers 
now take for granted that municipalities can restrict the public’s ac-
cess to engage in overnight First Amendment activity in traditional 
public forums.19 
This Article seeks to revisit the question of whether a traditional 
public forum like a park should be open for overnight camping when 
such camping is part of First Amendment protected conduct.  Part I 
of this Article examines whether sleeping overnight in a park can be 
considered First Amendment protected conduct.  It concludes that in 
the context of the Occupy movement, overnight sleeping in the park 
is expressive conduct deserving of First Amendment protection.  Part 
II reviews the history that led to the current legal standard for gov-
ernment regulation of expressive conduct.  It critiques the Supreme 
 
 15. See, e.g., Occupy Encampment in Asheville Comes to an End, NEWS CHAN-
NEL 7, http://www2.wspa.com/news/2012/feb/19/occupy-encampment-asheville-comes-
end-ar-3261522/ (last visited June 12, 2012); Grant Rodgers, 12 Occupy Protesters 
Arrested Outside State Capitol, DES MOINES REG. STAFF BLOG (Jan. 30, 2012, 12:00 
AM), http://blogs.desmoinesregister.com/dmr/index.php/2012/01/30/12-occupy-protes 
ters-arrested-outside-of-state-capitol/; Indio Woman, 66, Pleads Guilty to Breaking 
Curfew During ‘Occupy’ Protest, CBS L.A. (Feb. 7, 2012), http://losangeles.cbs 
local.com/2012/02/07/indio-woman-66-pleads-guilty-to-breaking-curfew-during-
occupy-protest/. 
 16. See, e.g., New York Civil Liberties Union, NYCLU Brokers Deal Between 
Rochester and Demonstrators to Protect Protest (Nov. 10, 2011), 
http://www.nyclu.org/news/nyclu-brokers-deal-between-rochester-and-demonstrators 
-protect-protest; New York Civil Liberties Union, NYCLU Brokers Deal Between 
Occupy Buffalo and City to Protect Protest (Dec. 9, 2011), http://www.nyclu.org/news 
/nyclu-brokers-deal-between-occupy-buffalo-and-city-protect-protest.  
 17. See, e.g., Occupy Fort Myers v. City of Fort Myers, No. 2:11-cv-00608, 2011 
WL 5554034 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 15, 2011); Freeman v. Morris, No. 11-CV-00452, 2011 
WL 6139216, at *5 (D.Me. Dec. 9, 2011); Occupy Boston v. City of Boston, No. 
SUCV201104152G, 2011 WL 7460294, at *1 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Nov. 17, 2011). 
 18. See Part II of this Article for a history of the Supreme Court’s move to a re-
strictive view of the public’s right to engage in expressive conduct, including over-
night camping as part of a demonstration in a public park. 
 19. This conclusion comes from conversations that I have had with lawyers from 
across the country who are working to protect the rights of the Occupy demonstra-
tors.  
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Court’s abandonment of the requirement that courts consider wheth-
er less restrictive means are available to government officials when 
regulating conduct that includes First Amendment-protected activity.  
Part III examines the difficulties that the Occupy movement has had 
in winning court battles to protect the right to engage in overnight 
expressive conduct.  The Article concludes with recommendations for 
local legislatures to restore the requirement that the government 
choose the least restrictive means when regulating expressive conduct 
in public forums. 
I.  SLEEPING OVERNIGHT IN A PARK AS FIRST AMENDMENT 
PROTECTED CONDUCT 
The first question to consider when determining whether the Oc-
cupy demonstrators should be permitted to camp overnight in a park 
is whether overnight sleeping in a park as part of a demonstration 
should be regarded as expressive conduct deserving of First Amend-
ment protection.  When should demonstrators’ actions receive the 
same level of protection as demonstrators’ words?  Traditional con-
duct by demonstrators, such as marching on a street, is treated as 
conduct protected by the First Amendment.20  But what about sleep-
ing in a traditional public forum, such as a park, for the purpose of 
protest?  Should this conduct be protected to the same degree as 
marching on a street? 
The Supreme Court has recognized that First Amendment protec-
tions extend beyond verbal expressions and has protected communi-
cative conduct in many forms.  In 1931, the Court overturned the 
conviction of a nineteen-year-old camp counselor for displaying a red 
flag as a symbol of opposition to the United States government,21  and 
treated the act of displaying the flag as a form of political expres-
 
 20. See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (“It is also true that 
‘public places’ historically associated with the free exercise of expressive activities, 
such as streets, sidewalks, and parks, are considered, without more, to be ‘public fo-
rums.’  In such places, the government’s ability to permissibly restrict expressive con-
duct is very limited.” (citations omitted)); Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 
112 (1969) (“Petitioners’ march, if peaceful and orderly, falls well within the sphere 
of conduct protected by the First Amendment.”); Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 
307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (“Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have 
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have 
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and 
discussing public questions.  Such use of the streets and public space has, from an-
cient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citi-
zens.”). 
 21. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 362 (1931). 
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sion.22  In 1966, the Supreme Court overturned the convictions of five 
black men who engaged in a sit-in in a racially segregated public li-
brary,23 finding that a silent protest against segregation in a public fa-
cility fell under the protections of the First Amendment, and the that 
the convictions of the demonstrators violated their rights to freedom 
of speech, assembly, and to petition the government for redress of 
grievances.24  In 1969, the Court rejected a school district’s regulation 
that prohibited the wearing of armbands to school, recognizing that 
the wearing of an armband for the purpose of expressing certain 
views should receive First Amendment protection as a symbolic act, 
and finding that the ban denied students’ their First Amendment right 
to express their opposition to the war in Vietnam.25   
The Supreme Court has provided additional guidance for when 
conduct should receive First Amendment protection.  In 1974, the 
Court, in a per curiam opinion, reversed the conviction of a college 
student for affixing a peace symbol on an upside-down flag to protest 
the war in Cambodia and the recent killing of protesting college stu-
dents at Kent State University.26  Harold Oman Spence displayed the 
upside-down United States flag outside of his apartment window and 
taped to the flag a large peace symbol.27  He wanted to associate the 
United States flag with peace rather than war.28  A Washington court 
convicted Spence of violating a state statute forbidding the display of 
a United States flag with attached figures or symbols.29  The Supreme 
Court reversed the conviction and held that the Washington statute as 
applied to Spence violated the First Amendment.30 
 
 22. See id. at 369–70. 
23. See generally Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966). When the librarian 
told the men that the book they wanted to rent was unavailable and then asked them 
to leave, the protesters remained in the library quietly. Ten to fifteen minutes later, 
the sheriff arrived and arrested the men for violating Louisiana’s breach of peace 
statute. 
 24. See id. at 141–142 The Court found not only that the protesters did not violate 
the breach of peace statute, but it also found that even if the demonstrators’ conduct 
had fallen within the statute’s prohibition, the statute would have been applied un-
constitutionally to the demonstrators’ actions. 
 25. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505–506 
(1969) (“As we shall discuss, the wearing of armbands in the circumstances of this 
case was… closely akin to ‘pure speech,’ which, we have repeatedly held, is entitled 
to comprehensive protection under the First Amendment.” (citation omitted)). 
 26. See Spence v. State of Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974). 
 27. See id. at 405–06. 
 28. See id. at 408. 
 29. See id. at 405. 
 30. See id. at 406. 
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The Supreme Court recognized that not all conduct in which a per-
son engages to convey an idea could be considered speech for pur-
poses of First Amendment protection.31  The Court emphasized two 
factors in determining whether conduct is communicative and deserv-
ing of First Amendment protection: “An intent to convey a particu-
larized message was present, and in the surrounding circumstances 
the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by 
those who viewed it.”32 
Context is key to the Court’s analysis of whether conduct may be 
considered speech.33  In Spence’s situation, within the context of the 
war in Cambodia and the recent killing of student demonstrators at 
Kent State University, an upside-down flag bearing a peace symbol 
changes the meaning to the act of displaying a flag.34  The Court thus 
concluded that Spence expressed his ideas and beliefs through activity 
that deserves First Amendment protections and should be shielded 
from criminal prosecution.35 
In Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, a case that will 
be discussed in greater detail below,36 the Supreme Court had an op-
portunity to clearly decide whether sleeping in tents in a park as part 
of a demonstration should be considered expressive activity deserving 
of First Amendment protection.37  In upholding the United States 
Park Service’s denial of a permit to a homeless rights organization 
seeking to sleep in tents overnight as part of a protest about home-
lessness, the Court assumed, but did not rule, that overnight sleeping 
in connection with the demonstration deserves First Amendment pro-
tection.38   
Thus, this leaves unresolved the preliminary question of whether 
the Occupy movement’s conduct of sleeping in public parks as part of 
its demonstrations deserves First Amendment protection.  Under the 
 
 31. See id. at 409. 
 32. See id. at 409–11. 
 33. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) 
(emphasizing that black armbands worn in school in the context of protesting the Vi-
etnam War deserved constitutional protection). 
 34. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410–11 (“[I]t was a pointed expression of anguish by ap-
pellant about the then-current domestic and foreign affairs of his government.  An 
intent to convey a particularized message was present, and in the surrounding cir-
cumstance the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those 
who viewed it.”). 
 35. See id. at 414. 
 36. See infra Part II.  
 37. See 468 U.S. 288, 290 (1984). 
 38. Id. at 293. 
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Spence test (intent to convey a message and the likelihood that in the 
surrounding circumstances, the message would be understood),39 the 
answer is yes. 
Setting up tents and sleeping in public parks twenty-four hours a 
day is a key component of the Occupy movement’s message in several 
ways.  First, as argued on behalf of Occupy Boston40 and Occupy Au-
gusta,41 the tent cities in many of the occupy camps have become a 
representation of hope for a more egalitarian and democratic society.  
Sleeping and eating communally in a park and making decisions col-
lectively through General Assembly meetings exemplify the model 
society that the Occupy movement seeks to create.  Second, the very 
name of the Occupy movement signifies the important role that phys-
ically inhabiting and taking over a public space is to the movement’s 
message.  Some of the Occupy protestors have taken over public 
space just outside of their state capitol buildings as a way to symbolize 
how the people are taking back control over their governments.42  Fi-
nally, as Occupy Ft. Myers and Occupy Minneapolis successfully ar-
gued, sleeping in the park and maintaining a presence in one place 
has been a key way of raising awareness about the economic inequali-
ties that the movement seeks to address.43  The encampments have 
allowed the movement to educate the general public about economic 
inequalities and other social justice issues44 and to do so “through 
symbolic, around-the-clock, peaceful protests referred to as ‘occupa-
tions.’”45 
The overnight sleeping in the parks has also been a key component 
of the Occupy movement’s successes in spreading its message to the 
public and the public’s understanding of that message in the context 
 
 39. See Spence, 418 U.S. at 410–11, 412. 
 40. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion for a Temporary 
Restraining Order and, After Hearing a Preliminary Injunction, at 5, Occupy Boston 
v. City of Boston, SUCV2011041526, 2011 WL 7460294 (Mass. Super. Nov. 17, 2011). 
 41. Freeman v. Morris, 11-CV-00452-NT, 2011 WL 6139216, at *5 (D. Me. Dec. 9, 
2011). 
 42. See, e.g., OCCUPY COLUMBIA, http://occupycolumbiasc.org (last visited Apr. 2, 
2012); Occupy Augusta, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/OCCUPYAUGUS 
TA (last visited Apr. 2. 2012). 
 43. For Occupy Minneapolis, sleeping in the park was a way to raise awareness of 
the foreclosure and homelessness crisis afflicting the nation. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum 
of Law in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary 
Injunction, at 33, Occupy Minneapolis v. County of Hennepin, 11-cv-3412-RHK-
TNL, 2011 WL 5878359 (D. Minn. Nov. 23, 2011). 
 44. See Occupy Fort Myers v. City of Fort Myers, No. 2:11-cv-00608, 2011 WL 
5554034, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 15, 2011). 
 45. Id. at *1. 
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of a major economic crisis.  As Judge Nancy Terresen explained in 
finding that Occupy Augusta’s tent city represented expressive con-
duct: 
The October 2008 stock market crisis, subsequent bank bailouts, 
high unemployment, deflation of the housing market, rise in foreclo-
sures, and increasing disparity between the incomes of the highest 
wage-earners and the low and middle-income earners are all well-
known and have set the stage for the Occupy movement.  Groups 
associated with Occupy Wall Street have coalesced in cities around 
the nation and their protests have received wide coverage in the 
press.  Those who view the tent cities erected by the Occupy move-
ment in general and by Occupy Augusta in particular are likely to 
understand that these tent cities in parks and squares near centers of 
government and finance symbolize a message about the unequal dis-
tribution of wealth and power in this country.46 
Similarly, Judge Frances A. McIntyre in Boston found that overnight 
sleeping and the setting up of tents deserve First Amendment protec-
tion because their message is understood by the public: “There is con-
siderable media attention devoted to Occupy sites, and most articles, 
per journalistic custom, restate the Occupy position.  The media has 
clearly understood the plaintiffs’ contribution to the national conver-
sation.”47 
Indeed, federal courts in Minneapolis,48 Boston,49 Fort Myers,50 Co-
lumbia,51 and Augusta52 have all found that the Occupy movement’s 
 
 46. Freeman, 2011 WL 6139216, at *5. Judge Terresen also found the overnight 
sleeping and the need to “occupy” the park twenty-four hours a day is expressive 
conduct deserving of First Amendment protection. Id. at *6. 
 47. Occupy Boston v. City of Boston, No. 11-4152-G, Reporter 16 (Super. Ct. 
Mass. Dec. 7, 2011). 
 48. See Occupy Minneapolis, 2011 WL 5878359, at *4 (“Plaintiffs correctly note 
that ‘tent cities and temporary shanties built on public property can be a form of ex-
pressive symbolic communication.’”). 
 49. See Occupy Boston, No. 11-4152-G, at 16 (“The setting up of tents, sleeping 
overnight, eating, and meeting in their General Assembly are all demonstrative and 
expressive of the democracy they claim to be creating.  Within the presentation of the 
case that has been made to me, this court can only conclude that those activities are 
communicative of the exemplar democracy they wish to convey.”). 
 50. See Occupy Fort Myers, 2011 WL 5554034, at *5 (“The Court finds that in the 
context of this case the tenting and sleeping in the park is described by plaintiffs’ 
counsel is symbolic conduct which is protected by the First Amendment.  The con-
duct of tenting and sleeping in the park 24 hours a day to simulate an ‘occupation’ is 
intended to be communicative and in context is reasonably understood by the viewer 
to be communicative.  The expressive conduct relates to matters of public concern 
because it can be fairly considered as relating to matter of political, social, or other 
OFER_CHRISTENSEN 7/11/2012  9:27 AM 
1166 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIX 
act of sleeping overnight in public grounds is expressive conduct that 
warrants the protections of the First Amendment. 
II.  GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF FIRST AMENDMENT 
PROTECTED COMMUNICATIVE CONDUCT 
Determining that conduct should receive First Amendment protec-
tion only begins the inquiry of whether and how the government may 
regulate the conduct.53  The Supreme Court’s view on this next phase 
of inquiry has evolved over time.  The Court first adopted a standard 
that took into consideration whether less restrictive means were 
available to the government to achieve its interest through regula-
tion.54  Yet over time the Court departed from that standard and 
eventually rejected it,55 which has led to the current predicament 
faced by the Occupy encampments. 
In 1968, the Court considered whether the public act of burning a 
Selective Service registration certificate as part of a demonstration 
against the war in Vietnam should receive First Amendment protec-
tion.56  David Paul O’Brien burned his card in 1966 knowing full well 
that it violated federal law.57  O’Brien challenged his conviction and 
the federal law as applied to him.58 
In upholding both the conviction and federal law,59 Chief Justice 
Warren, writing for the Court, articulated a four-part test to deter-
mine whether government action unconstitutionally infringes on First 
 
concern to the community and is a subject of general interest and of value and con-
cern to the public.”). 
 51. See Occupy Columbia v. Haley, No. 3:11-cv-03253-CMC, 2011 WL 6318587, at 
*7 (D. S.C. Dec. 16, 2011) (finding that Occupy Columbia’s camping on state grounds 
is likely expressive conduct under the Spence test). Eight days later the court upheld 
a prohibition on sleeping overnight after the state board formally adopted an emer-
gency regulation establishing such a prohibition.   
 52. See generally Freeman, 2011 WL 6139216. 
 53. This Article does not address what would typically be the second question in a 
court’s review of government regulation of expressive conduct: whether the conduct 
took place in a public forum or not, and if it did, whether the place is a traditional or 
limited public forum. 
 54. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377, 382 (1968). 
 55. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989). 
 56. See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 370 (O’Brien burned his card to “influence others to 
adopt his antiwar beliefs . . . ‘so that other people would reevaluate their positions 
with Selective Service, with the armed forces, and reevaluate their place in the cul-
ture of today, to hopefully consider my position.’”) 
 57. See id. at 369. 
 58. See id. at 376. 
 59. See id. at 372. 
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Amendment protected conduct: first, the government action must be 
“within the constitutional power of the government”; second, it must 
“further[] an important or substantial government interest”; third, the 
government’s interest must be unrelated to the suppression of the 
First Amendment protected expression; and fourth, the restriction on 
First Amendment expression must be no greater than is essential to 
the furtherance of the government interest.60  The Court held that the 
federal law banning the destruction of Selective Service cards met all 
four requirements and upheld O’Brien’s conviction.61 
In reaching its findings, the Court determined that the government 
had no other way to achieve its substantial interest in maintaining a 
meaningful military draft system: 
We perceive no alternative means that would more precisely and 
narrowly assure the continuing availability of issued Selective Ser-
vice certificates than a law which prohibits their willful mutilation or 
destruction . . . .  The 1965 Amendment prohibits such conduct and 
does nothing more.62 
The finding of no alternative means was key to the Court’s determi-
nation. 
O’Brien’s “no greater than essential” test, which has also been de-
scribed as a “less restrictive” or “least intrusive means” test,63 repre-
sented an important safeguard from the government relying on im-
portant interests—such as being able to enlist individuals for the 
military or to keep a park safe and clean—to curtail needlessly First 
Amendment rights.  The test required that government regulations 
genuinely be narrowly tailored and that the judiciary, when evaluat-
ing such government regulations of expressive conduct, consider 
 
 60. Id. at 377. 
 61. See id. 
 62. Id. at 381. 
 63. Courts have described O’Brien’s test in both ways. See, e.g., Rock Against 
Racism v. Ward, 848 F.2d 367, 370 (2d Cir. 1988) (recognizing that New York City 
had the right to regulate expressive conduct that harmed others, but cited O’Brien to 
find that “the method and extent of such regulation must be reasonable, that is, it 
must be the least intrusive upon the freedom of expression as is reasonably necessary 
to achieve a legitimate purpose of the regulation”); Int’l Soc. for Krishna Conscious-
ness, Inc. v. Heffron, 299 N.W.2d 79, 84 (Minn. 1980) (describing O’Brien’s no great-
er than essential test and then questioning whether the “state’s interest can be ade-
quately served by means less restrictive of First Amendment rights”); Comm. for 
Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 596-97 (D.C. Cir. 1983)(finding that the 
Park Department’s interest in preventing sleeping in the park to be “wanting under 
O’Brien’s ‘no greater [restriction] than is essential’ test; any interest in preventing 
other ‘camping’ activity can be furthered by less restrictive means”). 
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whether the government could have fulfilled its interests in a manner 
that had less of an impact on First Amendment rights. 
Fast forward to Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Con-
sciousness, when the Court upheld a Minnesota state fair regulation 
that restricted the distribution of literature and solicitation of funds to 
booths located in the fair.64  A Krishna organization challenged the 
regulation both on its face and as applied,65 contending that the regu-
lation would prohibit its members from engaging in their religious rit-
ual of going into public space to distribute religious literature and so-
licit donations.66 
The Supreme Court explained that the First Amendment does not 
permit individuals to communicate their views in any manner that 
they desire or at any time,67 but also recognized that the activities of 
the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON) 
should receive First Amendment protection, subject to reasonable 
time, place and manner restrictions.68  The Court set a test for when 
such restrictions are reasonable: “they are justified without reference 
to the content of the regulated speech . . . they serve a significant gov-
ernmental interest, and . . . in doing so they leave open ample alterna-
tive channels for communication of the information.”69 
Glaringly missing from the Court’s test was an explicit require-
ment, similar to the one in O’Brien,70 that the government action 
must be no greater than essential to meet the government’s interest.  
The Minnesota Supreme Court, which had held that the state fair rule 
would violate ISKCON’s First Amendment rights, applied this re-
quirement in holding that the state could have achieved its goals 
through less intrusive means.71  For example, the state fair could have 
 
 64. 452 U.S. 640, 643–44 (1981). 
 65. See id. at 644. 
 66. See id. at 645. 
 67. See id. at 647. 
 68. See id. 
 69. Id. at 648. 
 70. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
 71. Heffron, 299 N.W.2d at 83 (“What is at issue here is the reasonableness of the 
rule as a place and manner regulation. The application to an individual of a govern-
mental regulation which incidentally restricts him in the exercise of a First Amend-
ment right is permissible only if the regulation ‘furthers an important or substantial 
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of 
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment free-
doms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.’” (quoting 
O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377). The party urging that application of the regulation be up-
held has the burden of proving that these criteria are met. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 
347, 362 (1976). The defendants have not sustained that burden in this case.”) 
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penalized disorder rather than ban all potential disorder or limited 
the number of individuals who could solicit for donations.72  The Su-
preme Court rejected these considerations, and instead considered 
the burden that would be placed on the government when future or-
ganizations and individuals would attempt to apply for an exemption 
to the state fair rules.73  The court thus engaged in speculative fears in 
order to justify government action that was more restrictive of First 
Amendment protected conduct than necessary.74  The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Heffron, however, did not explicitly rule out the 
“no greater than essential” test.  The Court gave some consideration 
to other means.75  Thus, questions remained about the decision’s 
broader applicability. 
One year later a new controversy arose in Washington, D.C., which 
allowed the Court once again to step into the debate over regulation 
of expressive conduct.  The facts of the controversy are similar to the 
issues faced by the Occupy movement, and the Court’s handling of 
the case changed significantly the trajectory of the judiciary’s over-
sight of government regulation of expressive conduct, including in 
parks. 
In 1982, the United States Park Service granted the Community for 
Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) a renewable seven-day permit to 
conduct a round-the-clock protest in the Mall and Lafayette Park in 
Washington, D.C.76  The organizers wanted to educate the Reagan 
Administration, lawmakers, and the public about the challenges faced 
by the homeless community.77  The Park Service permitted CCNV to 
establish symbolic campsites in the parks but denied demonstrators 
permission to sleep in the campsites, finding that it would violate the 
 
 72. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 654. 
 73. Id. (“[W]e cannot agree with the Minnesota Supreme Court that Rule 6.05 is 
an unnecessary regulation because the State could avoid the threat to its interest 
posed by ISKCON by less restrictive means, such as penalizing disorder or disrup-
tion, limiting the number of solicitors, or putting more narrowly drawn restrictions on 
the location and movement of ISKCON’s representatives. As we have indicated, the 
inquiry must involve not only ISKCON, but also all other organizations that would 
be entitled to distribute, sell, or solicit if the booth rule may not be enforced with re-
spect to ISKCON. Looked at in this way, it is quite improbable that the alternative 
means suggested by the Minnesota Supreme Court would deal adequately with the 
problems posed by the much larger number of distributors and solicitors that would 
be present on the fairgrounds if the judgment below were affirmed.”). 
 74. Id. at 660–62 (Brennan, J., concurring).  
 75. Id. at 654. 
 76. Comm. for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 77. Id. 
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parks’ anti-camping regulations.78  CCNV objected, claiming that the 
prohibition prevented the organization and its members and support-
ers from being able to convey their core message about the unavaila-
bility of shelter for homeless people.79  They filed suit, seeking to in-
validate the denial of a permit for sleeping as an unconstitutional 
restriction on freedom of expression.80 
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
granted the government’s motion for summary judgment,81 and the 
D.C. Court of Appeals, in a per curiam decision, reversed and en-
joined the government from prohibiting demonstrators from sleeping 
in tents.82  Circuit Judge Abner J. Mikva filed an opinion rejecting the 
Park Service’s denial of permission for the homeless rights organiza-
tion to sleep in temporary structures.83  Judge Mikva first applied the 
Spence test to conclude that in the context of a large demonstration 
with tents, signs, and other expressions of views, sleeping could be 
understood as expressive conduct deserving of First Amendment pro-
tection, particularly since the protestors chose to sleep across from 
the White House and the Capitol.84  Judge Mikva then applied the 
O’Brien test to the government’s regulation of First Amendment pro-
 
 78. Id.  The Park Service regulation defined camping as  
“the use of park land for living accommodation purposes such as sleeping 
activities, or making preparations to sleep (including the laying down of 
bedding for the purpose of sleeping), or storing personal belongings, or 
making any fire, or using any tents or . . . other structure . . . for sleeping or 
doing any digging or earth breaking or carrying on cooking activities . . . . 
[The activities] constitute camping when it reasonably appears, in light of all 
the circumstances, that the participants, in conducting these activities, are in 
fact using the area as a living accommodation regardless of the intent of the 
participants or the nature of any other activities in which they may also be 
engaging.”  
Clark v. Comm. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 290-91 (1984) (quoting 36 
C.F.R. § 50.27(a)(1983)). 
 79. Comm. for Creative Non-Violence, 703 F.2d at 587. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. The court sat en banc and eleven judges produced six opinions; six judges held 
that the Park Service violated the demonstrators’ First Amendment rights and five 
judges disagreed. Id. at 586. 
 83. Id.  
 84. Id. at 592–93. Judge Mikva found that the twenty-four hour protest deserved 
the same protection under the First Amendment as a vigil. Id. at 594.  He also em-
phasized that he did not reach his conclusion because sleeping by a homeless rights 
organization is uniquely worthy of First Amendment protection; he found such dis-
tinctions to be content-based. Id. at 594.  He also rejected the government’s conten-
tion that providing CCNV the right to sleep in the park would open up the floodgates 
to allow non-demonstrators the right to sleep overnight in the park. Id. at 598–99. 
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tected conduct85 and determined that the regulation failed O’Brien’s 
“no greater than is essential” test.86  He determined that the govern-
ment’s interest in preserving the park could be accomplished through 
less restrictive means.87  For example, the renewable nature of the 
permit (it was granted for an initial seven day period subject to re-
newal) allowed the government to restrict activities if illegal conduct 
occurred.88  The government could also limit the number of tents or 
the size of the campsite.89  Judge Mikva concluded that the Park Ser-
vice had failed to prove that preventing the protesters from engaging 
in expressive conduct through overnight sleeping in a park as part of a 
protest would further the government’s interests.90 
The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion filed by Justice 
Byron White, reversed the Court of Appeals decision.91  As stated 
earlier, the Court assumed, but did not decide, for purposes of its rul-
ing that overnight sleeping in a park in connection with CCNV’s pro-
test was First Amendment-protected expressive conduct.92  The Su-
preme Court then held that the Park Service’s regulation satisfied 
both the reasonable time, place, or manner test and the test for regu-
lation of symbolic conduct.93  The Court found the regulation to be 
 
 85. Id. at 595 (“In short, O’Brien requires us to engage in a balancing of first 
amendment freedoms and their societal costs that is structured to place a thumb on 
the first amendment side of the scales.”).  Judge Mikva took the position that the Su-
preme Court in Heffron did not abandon O’Brien’s less restrictive means test, finding 
that the majority did in fact apply the test in his opinion. Id. at 597 n.28. 
 86. Id. at 596–97.  The Court also rejected the government’s contention that ille-
gitimate requests for camping by demonstrators will increase significantly, and that 
the Park Service would have to approve them. Id. at 598. Again, the court said that 
this could be easily addressed by denying permits for overnight sleeping when it is 
simply a “convenience” for a daytime rally, but granting permits for sleeping when it 
is expressive and part of a round-the-clock demonstration or vigil. Id. 
 87. Id. at 597. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 598. 
 90. Id. at 599. 
 91. Clark v. Comm. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 289 (1984). 
 92. Id. at 293. 
 93. Id. at 294. Under the reasonable time, place or manner test, restrictions are 
valid “provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the regulat-
ed speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental inter-
est, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the 
information.” Id. at 293. Similarly, according to Justice White, expressive conduct or 
symbolic expression may be regulated or even forbidden when “the conduct itself 
may constitutionally be regulated, if the regulation is narrowly drawn to further a 
substantial governmental interest, and if the interest is unrelated to the suppression 
of free speech.” Id. at 294 (referencing O’Brien, but not including a direct citation 
and omitting the other component of the test).   
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neutral, that it was not being applied because of a disagreement with 
CCNV over the message it sought to deliver, and that CCNV still had 
many other ways to deliver its message even with the prohibition on 
overnight sleeping.94  The Court concluded that the regulation was 
narrowly focused on the government’s substantial interest to preserve 
the parks in an attractive condition that is readily available to the 
many people who visit the parks in the nation’s capital.95  The Court 
took into consideration, as the Court did in Heffron, the impact that 
its ruling would have on future demonstrators and non-
demonstrators’ use of the parks.96 
The Supreme Court rejected the determination by the Court of 
Appeals that the Park Service’s denial of a permit for overnight sleep-
ing violated the O’Brien test for regulation of expressive conduct,97  
and in doing so, the Court applied a narrowly tailored test that did 
not consider whether less restrictive means existed to achieve the 
government’s interest in preserving the parks.98  Instead, the Court 
treated the analysis as one of deferring to administrative decisions 
over how best to preserve the parks, rather than an analysis that 
serves to ensure that both interests—preserving the park and engag-
ing in expressive conduct—could be fulfilled.99  Justice White ex-
plained this deference to the executive: 
We do not believe, however, that either United States v. O’Brien or 
the time, place, or manner decisions assign to the judiciary the au-
thority to replace the Park Service as the manager of the Nation’s 
parks or endow the judiciary with the competence to judge how 
much protection of park lands is wise and how that level of conser-
vation is to be attained.100  
Justice White had many options short of inserting the judiciary into a 
decision-making role over parkland,101 yet he chose not to question 
the Park Service’s rationale and its factual basis. 
 
 94. Id. at 295. 
 95. Id. at 296. CCNV argued that the incremental benefits to the parks could not 
justify the broad ban on sleeping, particularly when it involved First Amendment 
protected conduct. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, and in doing so, re-
marked, but did not rule, that the sleeping appeared to be more facilitative than ex-
pressive. Id. 
 96. Id. at 296–97. 
 97. Id. at 298.  
 98. See id. at 299. 
 99. See id. 
 100. See id.   
 101. Justice White could have remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals to 
determine whether CCNV could provide alternative means to engage in overnight 
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Justice Marshall filed the dissent, to which Justice Brennan joined, 
criticizing the majority for failing to fully scrutinize the government’s 
interest in justifying its restrictions as well as the impact of the re-
strictions on First Amendment protected activity.102  Justice Marshall 
found that CCNV’s planned activity was expressive conduct that 
qualified as symbolic speech103 and held that the application of the 
Park Service regulations failed to satisfy the reasonable time, place, 
and manner restrictions test.104 
Justice Marshall criticized Justice White and the government for 
failing to explain how denying CCNV a permit to sleep overnight in 
tents would substantially further the government’s interest in main-
taining the parks.105  Justice Marshall took particular umbrage at the 
lack of a factual showing that a real problem was posed to the gov-
ernment’s interest by CCNV’s request, rather than a speculative 
problem.106  Justice Marshall criticized the majority for never offering 
a justification for an absolute ban or how such a ban was in fact nar-
rowly tailored.107  He feared that the majority confused equality of 
treatment with protections of First Amendment activities,108 and 
warned that the majority ignored the incentives that sometimes exist 
for government officials to over-regulate and to choose to protect the 
 
sleeping without damaging the park, particularly since the Park Service already per-
mitted the erecting of tents.   
 102. Clark, 468 U.S. at 301 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 103. Id. at 306 (“By using sleep as an integral part of their mode of protest, re-
spondents ‘can express with their bodies the poignancy of their plight.  They can 
physically demonstrate the neglect from which they suffer with an articulateness even 
Dickens could not match.’” (quoting Comm. for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 227 
U.S. App. D.C. 19 (1983))). Justice Marshall held that whether the act of sleeping in 
the park was facilitative or not was irrelevant to determining whether the govern-
ment’s ban on overnight sleeping furthered a substantial interest, id. at 310, and that 
the facilitative nature of the conduct does not take away from its status as symbolic 
speech as well. Id. at n.7. 
 104. Id. at 308.  In a footnote, Justice Marshall agreed with the majority that there 
was no “substantial difference” between the O’Brien test and the reasonable time, 
place or manner restriction test. Id. n.6. 
 105. Id. at 308. 
 106. Id. at 311. No evidence had been offered that the absence of a total ban on 
overnight sleeping would present extraordinary problems, and similar to the Court’s 
rejection in Tinker of speculative problems as insufficient to curtail First Amendment 
protected conduct, Justice Marshall explained that mere apprehension of problems 
should not form the basis to restrict expressive conduct. Id. 
 107. Id. at 312. 
 108. Id. at 313 (“The Court, however, has transformed the ban against content dis-
tinction from a floor that offers all persons at least equal liberty under the First 
Amendment into a ceiling that restricts persons to the protection of First Amend-
ment equality—but nothing more.”). 
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general public over individuals who wish to engage in First Amend-
ment-protected conduct.109 
Seven years later, a majority of the Supreme Court put to rest any 
notion that the least restrictive means requirements still applied to 
regulations of expressive conduct.110  In 1986, New York City adopted 
a regulation that required that performances in the Acoustic 
Bandshell in Central Park use sound-amplification equipment and a 
sound technician provided by the city.111  The city did so to regulate 
the volume of sound at the bandshell so that it did not disturb indi-
viduals using the Sheep Meadow or who live on Central Park West.112  
Rock Against Racism, an anti-racism organization that had held an-
nual concerts at the bandshell from 1979 to 1986,113 challenged the 
new guidelines as a First Amendment violation.114  The District Court 
upheld the sound-amplification guidelines.115  The Court of Appeals 
reversed, finding that content-neutral time, place and manner regula-
tions must be the least intrusive upon freedom of expression, and that 
there were alternative means for the city to achieve its interest in con-
trolling excessive sound without intruding on Rock Against Racism’s 
First Amendment rights.116 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, reversed the Court of 
Appeals decision and found that the court wrongfully required New 
York City to prove that it had used the least intrusive means to fur-
ther its legitimate governmental interests.117  The Court recognized 
that music qualifies as expressive communication deserving of First 
Amendment protection.118  The Court then repeated the test used in 
Clark for regulation of protected speech in a public forum: the gov-
ernment may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or 
manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions are “justified 
without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are 
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and 
 
 109. Id. at 314–15. 
 110. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
 111. See id. at 784. 
 112. See id. 
 113. See id. at 784–85. 
 114. See id. at 787. 
 115. See id. at 788. 
 116. Id. at 789 (“For example, the city could have directed respondent’s sound 
technician to keep the volume below specified levels.  Alternatively, a volume-
limiting device could have been installed; and as a ‘last resort,’ the court suggested, 
‘the plug can be pulled on the sound to enforce the volume limit.’”) 
 117. Id. at 789–90. 
 118. Id. at 790. 
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that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of 
the information.”119 
The Supreme Court found that New York City’s regulation had 
been narrowly tailored to the satisfaction of the O’Brien and Clark 
tests, and rejected the analysis performed by the Court of Appeals of 
whether alternative means of regulation existed that would have been 
less intrusive to achieve the same government interest (protecting its 
residents from excessive noise).120  Justice Kennedy found that a least 
restrictive alternative analysis had never been part of the Court’s 
time, place and manner test and repeated the conclusion in Clark that 
the O’Brien test and the time, place, or manner restriction test were 
one and the same.121  According to Kennedy, narrow tailoring only 
required that the “regulation promotes a substantial government in-
terest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regula-
tion.”122 
Justice Kennedy did emphasize that a time, place, or manner regu-
lation may not burden substantially more speech than necessary to 
advance a legitimate government interest, but he also emphasized 
that courts should not second guess government regulations.123  He 
stated, “so long as the means chosen are not substantially broader 
than necessary to achieve the government’s interest . . . the regulation 
will not be invalid simply because a court concludes that the govern-
ment’s interest could be adequately served by some less-speech-
 
 119. Id. at 791. 
 120. Id. at 796–97 (“The Court of Appeals recognized the city’s substantial interest 
in limiting the sound emanating from the bandshell. The court concluded, however, 
that the city’s sound-amplification guideline was not narrowly tailored to further this 
interest, because ‘it has not [been] shown . . . that the requirement of the use of the 
city’s sound system and technician was the least intrusive means of regulating the 
volume.’ In the court’s judgment, there were several alternative methods of achieving 
the desired end that would have been less restrictive of respondent’s First Amend-
ment rights. The Court of Appeals erred in sifting through all the available or imag-
ined alternative means of regulating sound volume in order to determine whether the 
city’s solution was ‘the least intrusive means’ of achieving the desired end. This ‘less-
restrictive-alternative analysis . . . has never been a part of the inquiry into the validi-
ty of a time, place, and manner regulation.’ Instead, our cases quite clearly hold that 
restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech are not invalid ‘simply 
because there is some imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome on 
speech.’” (citations omitted)). 
 121. Id. at 797–99. 
 122. Id. at 799 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985)). 
 123. Id. at 800 (“‘The validity of [time, place, or manner] regulations does not turn 
on a judge’s agreement with the responsible decisionmaker concerning the most ap-
propriate method for promoting significant government interests’ or the degree to 
which those interests should be promoted.” (quoting Albertini, 472 U.S. at 689)). 
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restrictive alternative.”124  Justice Kennedy did not explain how future 
courts should reconcile between what appeared to be two contradic-
tory requests: that the government regulation not restrict substantial-
ly more speech than is necessary, and that courts refrain from review-
ing whether less intrusive means exist.  Justice Kennedy concluded 
that the Court of Appeals should have deferred to New York City’s 
determination of how best to control volume, thus echoing Justice 
White’s deferral in Clark to the executive.125 
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens, filed the 
dissent, criticizing the majority for eliminating what had been a key 
safeguard of freedom of expression: the requirement that government 
regulations adopt the least intrusive restriction necessary to achieve 
their interests.126  Marshall stated, “[b]y abandoning the requirement 
that time, place, and manner regulations must be narrowly tailored, 
the majority replaces constitutional scrutiny with mandatory defer-
ence.”127 
Justice Marshall disagreed with the majority’s contention that the 
Court, in past cases, had rejected the less-restrictive-alternative test as 
part of a narrow tailoring requirement.128  Quite the opposite, Mar-
shall explained, since in previous cases the Court had interpreted the 
narrow tailoring requirement to mandate a review of alternative ways 
of achieving the government’s interest and determining whether a 
regulation’s increased effectiveness outweighs any increased burden it 
places on First Amendment protected speech.129  Justice Marshall 
concluded with a strong warning: 
Today’s decision has significance far beyond the world of rock mu-
sic.  Government no longer need balance the effectiveness of regula-
tion with the burdens on free speech.  After today, government need 
only assert that it is most effective to control speech in advance of its 
expression. Because such a result eviscerates the First Amendment, 
I dissent.130 
Today, the Occupy movement is facing the consequences that Jus-
tice Marshall warned about in his dissent. 
 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 803 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 127. Id.  
 128. Id. at 804. 
 129. Id. at 804–05. 
 130. Id. at 812. 
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III.  THE OCCUPY MOVEMENT IN A POST-ROCK WORLD 
Not surprisingly, courts dealing with the Occupy movement have 
relied on Clark and Ward to uphold government restrictions on the 
Occupy movement’s attempts to sleep overnight in public parks, even 
while recognizing that sleeping overnight in the park is expressive 
conduct that merits First Amendment protection. 
In Minneapolis, for example, the court found that the ban on sleep-
ing in a public plaza and the prohibition on erecting tents constituted 
a valid time, place, and manner restriction under Clark.131  Even 
though the court found that the demonstrators’ desires to sleep over-
night in the public plaza amounted to expressive conduct, the court 
never considered whether Hennepin County could have restricted ac-
cess to the plazas in a less intrusive manner while still protecting the 
government’s interest in maintaining the plazas.132  For example, the 
county could have provided overnight access on a conditional basis, 
designated a smaller part of the plaza as the protest zone, or even lim-
ited the number of individuals who may camp out overnight to a rea-
sonable number. 
Similarly, the court in Occupy Boston’s challenge to the govern-
ment’s restrictions recognized that sleeping overnight by the protest-
ers represented expressive conduct, but also found the government’s 
prohibitions to be reasonable.133  The court held that the govern-
ment’s interest in keeping the public square open to the public justi-
fied a prohibition on overnight sleeping in the park by just one 
group,134 and that such a prohibition was narrowly tailored.135  Again, 
the court never considered alternative or less intrusive means to 
achieve the government’s interest of preserving the park and keeping 
it open to the public without infringing on Occupy Boston’s First 
Amendment rights (for example, the court could have instructed the 
government to limit the availability of space in the park for overnight 
 
 131. See Occupy Minneapolis v. County of Hennepin, Civ. No. 11-3412, 2011 WL 
5878359, at *6 (D. Minn. Nov. 23, 2011). 
 132. Id. 
 133. See Occupy Boston v. City of Boston, No. SUCV201104152G, 2011 WL 
7460294, at *1 (Sup. Ct. Mass. Nov. 17, 2011). 
 134. Judge Terresen ruled similarly in the Occupy Augusta matter, holding that 
permitting Occupy Augusta to camp overnight at a public park near the State Capitol 
would deprive other groups of the ability to exercise their First Amendment rights. 
Freeman v. Morris, No. 11-CV-00452, 2011 WL 6139216, at *12 (D. Me. Dec. 9, 
2011). 
 135. Occupy Boston, 2011 WL 7460294, at *4. 
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sleeping, thus not necessarily infringing on the ability of other mem-
bers of the public to enjoy the park). 
The Occupy movement has advocated successfully136 before the 
courts to allow sleeping overnight in a traditional public forum where 
they have been able to prove that the government’s regulations were 
content-based, triggering a strict scrutiny analysis.  In Columbia, 
South Carolina the state house grounds did not expressly prohibit 
camping until the Occupy demonstrators attempted to do so.137  The 
court granted a preliminary injunction enjoining the prohibitions on 
camping or sleeping as invalid time, place, and manner restrictions.138  
Eight days later, however, the court upheld as a reasonable content-
neutral regulation the prohibition on sleeping overnight after the 
state board formally adopted an emergency regulation prohibiting the 
use of the State House grounds for camping and sleeping.139 
 
 136. There have been instances outside of the Occupy movement where organiza-
tions have made successful arguments in court to carve out exceptions from prohibi-
tions on sleeping in public spaces for purposes of expressive conduct.  In Metropoli-
tan Council, Inc. v. Safir, for example, a tenants’ advocacy group planned a protest 
near the residence of the New York City mayor, in which the demonstrators would 
sleep on city sidewalks to convey the homelessness problem. 99 F. Supp. 2d 438 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).  New York City had a policy of preventing persons from sleeping on 
public sidewalks, and the plaintiff, represented by the New York Civil Liberties Un-
ion, won a preliminary injunction to enjoin the NYPD from preventing the protesters 
from sleeping on the sidewalks. Id. at 441, 450.  The court found the city’s prohibition 
to be overboard and in violation of the narrow tailoring requirement under Ward. Id. 
at 445.  The court did recognize that narrow tailoring did not require the city to use 
the least restrictive means. Id. Nevertheless, it found the city’s complete ban on 
sleeping on public sidewalks to be overbroad. Id. 
 137. Occupy Columbia v. Haley, No. 3:11cv 03253 CMC., 2011 WL 6318587, at *1 
(D.S.C. Dec. 16, 2011). 
 138. Id. at *10 (“Certainly the no-camping policy, as defined in Governor Haley’s 
Stipulation and the Board Defendants’ brief, is not content-neutral because it applies 
only to Occupy Columbia and provides no notice to other persons or groups who 
may wish to engage in expressive conduct involving camping or sleeping on the State 
House grounds . . . there is no evidence that this policy has been applied to any per-
son or group in the past.  In fact, participants in Occupy Columbia slept on the 
grounds with sleeping bags and tarps for over 30 days before the State attempted to 
enforce this policy.”). 
 139. Occupy Columbia, 2011 WL 6318587, at *1.  Interestingly, the court criticized 
Occupy Columbia for not demonstrating that the government’s interest in preserving 
and maintaining safety in the park could have been served by a more narrow re-
striction on camping and sleeping.  Id. at *6.  The court thus appeared to have been 
open to an O’Brien-like narrow tailoring test, and even cited the O’Brien test in its 
decision (although it also referenced Clark’s assertion that the O’Brien test was hard-
ly different from the standard time, place, or manner restriction test). Id. at *7. 
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IV.  RESTORING THE RIGHT TO OVERNIGHT PROTEST IN PUBLIC 
PARKS 
The courts are of little use (with few exceptions) to demonstrators 
who wish to maintain a constant presence in a public space such as a 
park.140  This fact has significant implications on the ability of individ-
uals to engage in sustained protests in the United States.  Park cur-
fews and similar restrictions that may appear to be content neutral 
have a significant and unique impact on individuals attempting to 
convey a political and social message using a tactic that numerous 
courts have recognized as deserving of First Amendment protection 
(camping and sleeping), yet in practice cannot be deployed in a mean-
ingful manner.  This impact can be seen in the Occupy movement’s 
experiences in Zuccotti Park: when protesters were able to maintain a 
constant presence in the park, a community developed that received 
daily attention from the public and was able to portray its vision of 
communal living and participatory democracy.  Following the remov-
al of the tents and the aggressive enforcement of restrictions on sleep-
ing and camping, the movement has continued in a very different 
manner that no longer captures the public’s attention in the same 
way. 
Therefore, I propose that local legislatures change the law to pro-
tect the rights of demonstrators.  The experiences of the Occupy de-
monstrators provide a rare opportunity to re-evaluate and repair de-
ficiencies in current First Amendment jurisprudence.  Lawmakers in 
cities, towns, and villages can fill in the gap left by the judiciary and 
pass laws that restore the requirement that the government must use 
the least restrictive means when regulating expressive conduct.  This 
restoration could focus on all government regulations of expressive 
conduct in public forums, or it could focus on requiring such exhaus-
tion of alternatives in parks only. 
The legislation, which could be named the “Protecting the Right to 
Protest Bill,” should address the concerns raised by Justice Marshall 
in his dissents in Clark141 and Ward142 about government over-
regulation of expressive conduct.  First, the legislation will have to re-
quire that before the government makes a final determination to re-
strict the public’s right to engage in expressive conduct in a park or 
other public forum, it must explore meaningfully lesser restrictive al-
 
 140. See supra Part III. 
 141. See supra notes 108–15 and accompanying text. 
 142. See supra notes 132–38 and accompanying text. 
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ternatives.  Under the legislation, for example, before banning all 
overnight camping and sleeping by demonstrators, the government 
would be required to explore other avenues that both protect the 
park and also ensure that protesters may engage in First Amendment 
protected conduct.  Such alternatives could include limiting the area 
within a park where demonstrators may camp or sleep, or limiting the 
number of tents that may be erected for sleeping purposes on any 
given night.  The government would be required to choose the least 
restrictive option that still allows it to achieve its interest. 
Second, under the legislation, the government will be prohibited 
from basing its restrictions on speculative assertions of future mis-
conduct.  Government restrictions on expressive conduct will have to 
be based on factual scenarios where the government’s interest actual-
ly has been threatened, or there is a very high likelihood that it will be 
threatened.  In the Occupy context, the government would have to 
make a factual showing that the demonstrators’ requests pose a real 
danger to the government’s interest in maintaining the parks.  Similar 
requirements exist in the prohibition on schools from restricting stu-
dents’ First Amendment rights based on general fears of disturb-
ances.143  The Supreme Court has stated that such government re-
strictions on expressive conduct cannot take place based on an 
“undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance” and without a 
finding and showing that the forbidden conduct would “materially 
and substantially” disrupt the interest that the school seeks to pro-
tect.144 
 
 143. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508–09 (1969) 
(“The District Court concluded that the action of the school authorities was reasona-
ble because it was based upon their fear of a disturbance from the wearing of the 
armbands. But, in our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is 
not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.  Any departure from ab-
solute regimentation may cause trouble. Any variation from the majority’s opinion 
may inspire fear. Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that 
deviates from the views of another person may start an argument or cause a disturb-
ance. But our Constitution says we must take this risk, and our history says that it is 
this sort of hazardous freedom—this kind of openness—that is the basis of our na-
tional strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and 
live in this relatively permissive, often disputatious, society.”). 
 144. Id. (“In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify prohibi-
tion of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its action was 
caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleas-
antness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint. Certainly where there is no 
finding and no showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct would ‘materially and 
substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the opera-
tion of the school,’ the prohibition cannot be sustained.”(citations omitted)). 
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Advocates will be faced with opposition and potential risks when 
engaging lawmakers in expanding First Amendment protections 
through the legislative process, particularly in the context of the Oc-
cupy movement.  First, in the places where lawmakers have been en-
gaged, it has been in the opposite direction, restricting protest rights 
rather than expanding them.145  Second, exaggerated concerns over 
tying the hands of government decision-makers will be raised, and 
examples will surely be given of the small percentage of instances 
where illegal or violent activities occurred in the surrounding areas of 
Occupy encampments. 
The first concern should be addressed by focusing initially on pass-
ing legislation in localities that would be more sympathetic to protect-
ing the rights of the Occupy demonstrators.  These localities will serve 
as testing grounds for the legislation, and will assist to assuage the 
naysayers who fear expanding First Amendment protections over ex-
pressive activities.  In these localities, alliances should be made with 
conservative and libertarian movements, such as the Tea Party, who 
are also concerned about ensuring that demonstrators are able to en-
gage in expressive conduct.  Once such bills pass in a few jurisdictions, 
their precedent will increase the likelihood that less supportive locali-
ties will pass such legislation. 
The second concern should be addressed by explaining to policy-
makers that this legislative proposal will allow the government to con-
tinue to consider all of its options, but will ensure that the final option 
that is chosen will achieve both the goals of protecting the govern-
ment’s interests and the right of the people to engage in First 
Amendment protected conduct.  The requirement of considering the 
least restrictive means will ensure careful deliberation by the gov-
ernment, which will then result in better judgments.  While it is true 
that government officials will lose some of their freedom of choice 
and be required to choose the least restrictive option, they will also be 
required to continue to protect their own interests.  Ultimately, both 
the government’s interests and the protesters’ interests will be upheld.  
 
 145. See, e.g., David Davis, State House OKs Bill On Equal Access, CLEVELAND 
DAILY BANNER (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.clevelandbanner.com/view/full_story/175 
68396/article-State-House-OKs-bill-on-equal-access; Arun Gupta & Michelle Faw-
cett, Occupy Fights the Law: Will the Law Win? From Boise to Nashville, the Move-
ment Faces an Unconstitutional Legal Siege, SALON.COM (Feb 14, 2012 1:00 PM), 
http://www.salon.com/2012/02/14/occupy_fights_the_law_will_the_law_win/; Adam 
Tarchoun, Binghamton Tells “Occupy” to Stay out, PIPE DREAM (Feb. 10, 2012), 
http://www.bupipedream.com/news/7896/binghamton-tells-occupy-stay/. 
